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1. Introduction:
When a party is elected to act in the interest of another party, principal-agent problems or
agency problems arise.  Agency problems, especially in the light of financial crisis in the late 2000s, are a 
continuous concern for corporations. From agency perspective, stock awards are used to tie managers’ 
compensation to the performance of the company. The CEO whose compensation relies on company’s 
performance will be less willing to take risk than a diversified shareholder. In order to address the issue, 
equity based compensation such as option awards are used to reduce conflict of interest between 
managers and shareholders. The question is, are these remuneration packages effective in aligning 
interests, and if so, to what extent?  
Researchers have examined the effectiveness of these compensation schemes in increasing 
shareholders’ value by studying structure of the incentive packages and examining the relation between 
different firm performance measures and value and structure of the compensation. In literature review 
section, this dissertation will give a summary of the findings of previous literature on the link between 
pay and performance.  
More specifically, I will review the literature on the link between executive payout and firm risk-
taking. After global financial meltdown following subprime mortgage crisis, regulatory bodies have 
focused on contingent compensation made to executives. This was due the belief that these 
compensation packages encouraged managers to deliberately take excessive risk in the expense of 
overall economy; e.g. since options are designed to eliminate downside risk, when a high proportion of 
executive’s pay comes from option grants, the executive may tend to make the firm more risky in order 
to increase the value of her compensation. Building on this, I examine the relation between executive 
compensation, especially equity-linked compensation, and riskiness of the firm in US REITS - Real Estate 
Investment Trusts.  
Two measures are used to measure firm risk, stock volatility and firm historical 99 percent value 
at risk both calculated annually. The Value-at-Risk (VaR) is especially relevant to this thesis because it 
only focuses on downside of return distribution and it has been adopted by regulators.   
I examine the compensation-risk relation in Real Estate Investment Trusts. REIT is a company 
that owns, and in most cases operates, income-producing real estate. REIT is a highly regulated industry 
complying with U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. REITS need several conditions to maintain 
their federal tax-exempt status. They must distribute at least 90% of their taxable income to their 
shareholders in the form of dividends, must have at least 100 or more shareholders, have no more than 
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50% of the shares held by five or fewer individuals during the last half of each taxable year, must not be 
a financial institution or an insurance company, have at least 75% of its total assets invested in real 
estate, derive at least 75% of its gross income from rents or mortgage interests. REITS are highly 
regulated funds that need to follow strict regulation to maintain their tax requirement; this will limit the 
means by which a manager can take risk as the only way for an executive in REITS to increase risk is 
through equity, as other means such as R&D and operational risk tools are not available.   
My hypothesis is that there is a positive relation between REITS riskiness and executive equity-
linked compensation (ELC) where ELC is any compensation in the form of stock grants or option grants. 
Also, especially when higher proportion of ELC compensation comes from option grants, I expect to see 
a positive relation between ELC and risk. The case for REITS is especially interesting Because equity is the 
only means through which REITS executives can increase risk and therefore it should be interesting to 
examine the “pay-risk” relation in real estate investment trusts.  
This research especially adds to the literature in that few of the previous studies have focused 
on the direct relation between REIT equity risk and executive equity linked compensation. Previous 
literature in REITS have mostly been interested in pay-performance relation and have only considered 
risk as one of the many factors in determining executive compensation.  
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. 
Section 3 covers data sources and variables used. Section 4 covers data analysis and results and section 
5 concludes. 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
There is extensive body of research on the subject of agency problems- conflict of interest
between people responsible for managing the company and company stockholders. Agency problem 
arise because ownership and control of a corporation are separated from each other. According to 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), the less the managers own the company, the more agency costs the 
company will incur.  
Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) argue that executive compensation, in their case CEO 
compensation, is a result of negotiation between CEO and board of directors such that as the CEO 
becomes more powerful or the board of director becomes less independent, the more likely that the 
CEO demands more income in the form of cash salary and bonus rather than equity linked 
compensation such as stock or option grants. Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried (2003) further argue that 
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managerial power and rent extraction have an important influence on the design of compensation 
schemes.  
While it’s impossible to completely eliminate agency costs, board of directors try to motivate 
managers through means such as performance based compensation which tie managers’ compensation 
with company’s overall performance and hence reduce the conflict of interest between executives and 
shareholders. Bryan, Hwang, and Lilien (2000) argue that stock options not only align shareholders’ 
interest with those of managers but it also encourages risk-averse managers to invest in riskier projects 
that they would otherwise do. 
There is extensive literature on the relation between managers’ compensation and company 
performance and researchers have used many different approaches to examine “pay-performance” 
relation. Firm performance is usually measured by return on equity, return on assets, stock market 
returns, Tobin’s q or combination of these and compensation usually includes any combination of salary, 
bonus, and stock and option grants.  
Prior research shows a mixed result on the connection between pay and performance. Some 
have found a positive “pay-performance” relation Murphy (1985), and some have found weak or 
insignificant “pay-performance” relation (Jensen and Murphy, 1990, Benmelech, Kandel, and Veronesi, 
2010) and yet some others have even found a negative relation (Pennathur, Gilley, and Shelor (2005), 
Armstrong, Jagolinzer and Larcker, 2010).  
Mehran (1995) has found that Tobin’s Q and ROA is positively related to equity linked 
compensation and top management’s ownership. Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) find positive 
relation between total, cash, and salary compensation on one hand and firm size, investment 
opportunities, stock returns, and standard deviation ROA on the other. Ryan and Wiggins (2000) find 
positive relation between equity-based awards and investment growth opportunities, firm size, 
institutional holdings, percentage of outsiders in the board, and leverage respectively. Stammerjohan 
(2004) finds that Stock options are positively related to subsequent performance (t+1, t+3, t+5). 
(Noguera, 2007) 
 
Pay vs. Risk 
Stock options are introduced as compensation to managers to induce them to take more risk; 
Grant, Markarian, and Parbonetti (2009). The behavioral agency model predicts that managers have less 
inventive to take risk than a diversified shareholder and therefore, managers might avoid some risky but 
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positive NPV investment opportunities. Stock awards as compensation would exacerbate this as the 
manager wouldn’t want to make his wealth more risky. Managers try to reduce earnings and stock price 
volatility as volatility adversely affects their tenure and personal wealth. Because options eliminate 
downside risk, compensation in the form of option awards is used to motivate managers to take more 
risk.  
From the perspective of risk-taking incentives embedded in Option grants, studies have 
established a positive relation with CEO risk-taking behavior. Coles, Naveen, and Naveen (2006) provide 
empirical evidence of a strong causal relation between managerial compensation and investment policy, 
debt policy and firm risk.  Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002) find that executive stock options provide 
managers with incentives to mitigate risk-related incentive problems.  According to Rajgopal et al. 
(2004) stock option compensation appear to be associated with increased risk taking. Shi (2004) 
separates risk into industry- and firm-specific risk and finds that risk-taking incentives is negatively 
correlated with industry risk but positively with firm-specific risk. He also finds that the more risk taking 
incentive the manager has, the more diverse a firm's investing activity will be. 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008-2009, many believe that executive pay 
arrangements might have encouraged excessive risk-taking and that fixing those arrangements will be 
important in preventing similar excesses in the future (Bebchuk, Cohen and Spamann ,2010). Bhagat and 
Bolton (2014) study the executive compensation structure in 14 of the largest U.S. financial institutions 
during 2000–2008 and find that incentives generated by executive compensation programs are 
correlated with excessive risk-taking by banks.  These findings are in agreement with my hypothesis that 
there should be positive link between risk executive compensation and risk.   
Executive compensation in Real Estate Investment Funds - REITS 
Although highly regulated, significant proportion of compensation in REITS comes from equity 
linked compensation and for this reason different researchers have examined the link between REIT firm 
performance and executive compensation. Hardin (1998) finds a positive relation between cash 
compensation and REIT firm size and senior executive stock ownership.  Chopin, Dickens and Sehlor 
(1995) find positive relation between REIT revenue and size and CEO compensation. Scott, Anderson, 
and Loviscek (2001) examine the explanatory power the market-based performance measures have on 
REIT executives’ total incentive compensation and find positive relation between performance 
compensation and firm size and REIT stock return.   
Pennathur, Gilley, and Shelor (2005) examine the relation between REIT CEO stock-based 
compensation and performance measures across different real estate industries and find negative 
11 
relation between option awards and REIT stock performance and size. They also found Positive relation 
between option awards and stock returns volatility and negative relation between option awards and 
firm performance. Feng, Ghosh, and Sirmans (2007) find a positive relation between REIT performance 
and equity based compensation.  
In a more recent study, Griffith, Najand, and Weeks (2011) examine the relation between CEO 
compensation and CEO power, firm size, firm performance, firm risk and CEO risk aversion. They find 
that performance and size do not influence CEO salary while CEO specific characteristics such as tenure, 
title, ownership and age have significant effects. They also find no relation between bonus and risk, CEO 
power or size. They find that option awards are affected by performance and CEO power.  
Despite the abundance of literature on the link between pay and various other variables 
including firm performance, there has not been much research done on the direct relation between risk 
and equity based compensation, especially in REITS. This paper adds to the literature as it examines the 
direct relation between REITS firm risk and executive compensations. I also extend the literature by 
using value at risk as an additional measurement of risk, beside volatility.   
3. Methodology and Data 
As mentioned in previous section, I hypothesize a positive relation between REITS equity-linked 
compensation and firm risk. Linear regression is used to model this hypothesis. Initially, Risk is estimated 
by a single predictor, which is proportion of equity-linked compensation, on the right hand side.  This 
hypothesis is modeled as: 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1 × (𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑘𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠) 
As discussed in the literature review, researchers have argued that the reason for including 
options as form of incentive for executives is to induce them to take more risk. Therefore I am 
interested to model risk and both components of equity-linked compensation at the same time to 
observe any difference from single predictor regression. Therefore, in the next stage, risk is modeled by 
both stock grants and option grants proportions simultaneously in a multiple linear regression.   
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 × (𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) + 𝛽2 × (𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) 
 
Two variables are used to represent risk:  
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Risk: 
Annual Volatility = Standard deviation of daily returns multiplied by 
squared root of number of trading days 
 
Historical 99 percent 
Value at Risk  
= Calculated empirically by sorting the daily return 
values and taking the first percentage.  
 
Predictor variables are either of the three below 
Equity-Linked Compensation: 
Stock Grant 
Proportion  
= Proportion of the total compensation that comes 
from Stock Grants 
 
Option Grant 
Proportion 
= Proportion of the total compensation that comes 
from Option Grants 
 
Total ELC Proportion = Proportion of the total compensation that comes 
from Equity Linked Compensation  
 
Data Sample 
Executive compensation data was retrieved from the Wharton Research Data Services’ (WRDS’) 
CompuStat Execucomp database. Each year CompuStat Execucomp database collects compensation 
data for top five executives within each firm. For the purpose of this study only observations marked 
with CEO or CFO flags are selected. Within CompuStat Execucomp, I initially narrowed the compensation 
data to companies with SPINDEX 4040 representing real estate industry group. The resulting data 
contained compensation for CEOs and CFOs for 95 real estate companies. I eliminated the companies 
with fragmented compensation data and eventually selected 83 companies with SPINDEX 4040. 
To give my analysis more focus, I reduced the sample of companies to current members of S&P 
500 Real Estate Investment Trusts Industry Index- “S5REITS”, a representative of the US REITS Market. I 
obtained tickers for S5REITS index from Bloomberg and used the list to refine my results from 
CompuStat Execucomp. 
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I choose the 2006-2012 as the range for my executive compensation data. This is due the fact that in 
2006 new disclosure requirements required greater transparency of chief financial officer compensation 
as well as equity linked compensation. 
For each company I selected the following information:  
- Company Name 
- Company ID Number 
- Ticker Symbol 
For each executive I included the following data: 
- EXEC_FULLNAME:  full name of the executive 
- Company ID Number :  the GVKEY assigned by WRDS 
For compensation data out of 69 data type available I selected the following information: 
- YEAR :   the year that the compensation was recorded 
- CEOANN   Flag indicating CEO 
- CFOANN -  Flag Indicating CFO 
Compensation data: 
- SALARY :  total salary paid during the year 
- BONUS :  total bonus paid during the year 
- STOCK AWARDS :  
Annual value of stock awards to the executive calculated as per  FAS 
123R ($) 
- OPTION_AWARDS_BLK_VALUE :  
Annual value of options granted to the executive calculated in 
Compustat following Black Scholes 
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- PENSION_CHG :  
Annual change in pension value owned to the executive  
- ALLOTHTOT -- All Other Total 
After organizing the data, I had compensation data for CEO, CFO, and sum of the compensation 
for CFO and CFO in separate sheets.   
I defined my variables according to my model, as follows:  
ANN_COMP i,t,exec.: total annual compensation  
i indicating firm,  
t indicating year,  
exec. indicating executive type CEO or CFO 
ANN_COMPi,t,exec = SALARY   +   BONUS   +   OPTION _ AWARDS _ BLK _ VALUE    +  
           STOCK _ AWARDS    +     PENSION _ CHG    +   ALLOTHTOT 
The option grant proportion - OG Prop , stock award proportion - SG Prop, and total equity 
linked proportion-ELC Prop to total annual compensation value - ANN_COMP were defined as:  
OG Prop i,t,exec  = (OPTION_AWARDS_BLK_VALUE i,t,exec) / ANN_COMP i,t,exec 
Proportion of total compensation that comes from option grants 
 
SG Prop i,t,exec  = (STOCK AWARDS i,t,exec ) / ANN_COMP i,t,exec 
Proportion of total compensation that comes from stock grants 
 
ELC Prop i,t,exec  = (OPTION_AWARDS_BLK_VALUE + STOCK AWARDS) / ANN_COMP i,t,exec 
Proportion of total compensation that comes from ELC 
I wrote a MATLAB code to read the ticker and year and obtain daily stock prices from Yahoo 
Finance and calculate the standard deviation of daily returns and annually scale it. I also wrote a 
function to calculate 99 percent value at risk in my code. The MATLAB code automatically updated 
the data set. Now each company had data for standard deviation and value at risk. 
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Modeling 
Putting my variables in my hypothesized model, following regression models are resulted. 
 (𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑅99 𝑂𝑅 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦)𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟,𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚,𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒, 
 
=  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 × =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 × =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 × 
(𝑂𝐺 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝)𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟,𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚,𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒  (𝑆𝐺 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝)𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟,𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚,𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒  (𝐸𝐿𝐶 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝)𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟,𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚,𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒  
 
Equations above evaluate the relation between REITS annual risk and annual option grants 
proportion, stock grant proportion and overall equity linked proportion respectively.  
 
 
Multilinear regression model is as follows: (𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑅99 𝑂𝑅 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦)𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟,𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚,𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒, 
 
 =         𝛽0 +    𝛽1 × (𝑂𝐺 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝)𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟,𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚,𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 + 
𝛽2 × (𝑆𝐺 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝)𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟,𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚,𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒  
Equation above examines the simultaneous predicting power option grants and stock grants have on 
firm risk - 99 per cent value at risk and standard deviation. 
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4. Data Analysis 
SPINDEX 4040 :2006-2012 
The summary of the result of my data analysis for 83 real estate firm woth SPINDEX4040 comes 
below. 
Index Executive Output variable Regressors [beta0 beta1] R^2 
SP
IN
DE
X4
04
0 
CEO 
Volatility 
SG Proportion [0.476 0.099] .01186 
OG Proportion [0.419 0.096] 0.00399 
ELC Proportion [0.465 0.066] 0.005 
Value at Risk 
SG Proportion [0.076 0.016] 0.0103 
OG Proportion [0.067 0.014] 0.0029 
ELC Proportion [0.074 0.0109] 0.0048 
CFO 
Volatility 
SG Proportion [0.472 -0.097] 0.0089 
OG Proportion [0.4234 0.077] 0.0017 
ELC Proportion [0.469 0.0781] 0.0054 
Value at Risk 
SG Proportion [0.075 0.0153] 0.0076 
OG Proportion [0.0677 -0.012] 0.0014 
ELC Proportion [0.075 -0.0124] 0.0047 
CEO & CFO 
Volatility 
SG Proportion [0.47 0.097] 0.0103 
OG Proportion [0.42 0.086] 0.0026 
ELC Proportion [0.466 -0.0707] 0.00526 
Value at Risk SG Proportion [0.0756 0.0154] 0.00892 
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OG Proportion [0.0675 0.0127] 0.0020 
ELC Proportion [0.0747 0.0116] 0.0048 
CEO + CFO 
Volatility 
SG Proportion [0.483 0.111] 0.0125 
OG Proportion [0.421 0.0948] 0.0032 
ELC Proportion [0.476 0.0819] 0.0064 
Value at Risk 
SG Proportion [0.0772 0.0177] 0.0109 
OG Proportion [0.0674 0.0146] 0.0026 
ELC Proportion [0.0762 0.0133] 0.0058 
Table 1-regression results for SPINDEX4040    Risk = β0+ β1×(Equity Linked Compensation Proportions) 
Despite my initial hypothesis, I did not find any significant relation between U.S. real estate 
firms satisfying SPINDEX 4040 risk measured as volatility and value at risk and the value of equity-linked 
compensation for the period of 2006 to 2012. No distinct trend or pattern was visible with a coefficient 
of determination of, at most, 0.0125. 
Figure 1 below demonstrates a sample of the above result as shown in a scatterplot. Figure 1- SPINDEX 
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4040 : CEO+CFO ELC vs. Volatility and Value at Risk 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the scatterplot of equity-linked compensation proportion values for both CEOs and 
CFOs on one side and firm risk on the other. There’s no significant relation between ELC components 
and risk in REITS based on the framework used in this research. The scatterplot also shows that in REITS 
stock awards are used more frequently than option awards. 
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 S5REITS: 2006-2012 
The summary of the result of my data analysis for S5RETS index is as follows. 
Index Executive Output variable Regressors [beta0 beta1] R^2 
S5
RE
IT
S 
 
CEO 
Volatility 
SG Proportion 
OG Proportion 
ELC Proportion 
[0.506 0.210] 
[0.39 0.1165] 
0.051 
0.011 
[0.4936 0.1281] 0.018 
Value at Risk 
SG Proportion 
OG Proportion 
ELC Proportion 
[0.081 0.0329] 
[0.063 -0.019] 
[0.078 0.019] 
0.041 
0.01033 
0.01367 
CFO 
Volatility 
SG Proportion 
OG Proportion 
ELC Proportion 
[0.48 0.18] 
[0.39 0.151] 
[0.47 0.103] 
0.0264 
0.0106 
0.0078 
Value at Risk 
SG Proportion 
OG Proportion 
ELC Proportion 
[0.075 0.022] 
[0.063 -0.022] 
[0.072 0.01] 
0.0128 
0.007 
0.0025 
CEO & CFO 
Volatility 
SG Proportion 
OG Proportion 
ELC Proportion 
[0.466 0.18] 
[0.39 0.0938] 
[0.4826 0.1275] 
0.0316 
0.005 
0.0154 
Value at Risk 
SG Proportion 
OG Proportion 
ELC Proportion 
[0.077 0.0274] 
[0.062 0.0179] 
[0.076 0.0171] 
0.0232 
0.0059 
0.0089 
CEO + CFO 
Volatility 
SG Proportion 
OG Proportion 
ELC Proportion 
[0.514 0.234] 
[0.381 0.146] 
[0.487 0.128] 
0.051 
0.0147 
0.015 
Value at Risk 
SG Proportion 
OG Proportion 
ELC Proportion 
[0.082 0.036] 
[0.061 0.026] 
[0.076 0.017] 
0.038 
0.014 
0.008 
Table 2-regression results for S5REITS- Risk = β0+ β1×(Equity Linked Compensation Proportions) 
 
When I tested the framework for S5REITS firms, the relation became less although still, 
insignificant.  For example, CEO Stock grant versus volatility and value at risk returned coefficient of 
determination of 0.05 which is higher than the values calculated for all SPINDEX4040 firms, but still 
insignificant. Figure 2 below demonstrates proportions of executive compensation versus firm risk 
measures. Because there are fewer firms in S5REITS and as a result, fewer observations, data points are 
more visible.  
Figure 2 - S5REITS: CEO_CFO ELC vs. Volatility and Value at Risk 
The coefficient of determinations are low, at most 0.03, and the regressed lines are almost flat, 
indicating no significant relation between stock grants, option grants or sum of the two versus firm risk 
measured by annual standard deviation and 99 percent value at risk.
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Multilinear regressions  
I expected that examining both stock grants and option grants predicting capacity on firm risk would 
give new perspective as stock grants and option grants are different from risk-taking perspective.  
Index Executive Output variable Regressors [beta0 beta1 beta2] R^2 
SP
IN
DE
X 
40
40
 
CEO 
Volatility SG   OG [0.4672 -0.0906 0.0491] 0.0128 
Value at Risk SG   OG [-0.0749 0.0147 -0.0064] 0.0109 
CFO 
Volatility SG   OG [0.4688 -0.0932 0.0216] 0.0090 
Value at Risk SG   OG [-0.0749 0.0148 -0.0032] 0.0077 
CEO & CFO 
Volatility SG   OG [0.4672 -0.0906 0.0365] 0.0107 
Value at Risk SG   OG [-0.0749 0.0146 -0.0047] 0.0092 
CEO + CFO 
Volatility SG   OG [0.4767 -0.1042 0.0351] 0.0129 
Value at Risk SG   OG [-0.0763 0.0168 -0.005] 0.0113 
Table 3-Multinlear regression results for SPINDEX4040- Risk = β0+ β1×(SG Prop) +β2×(OG Prop) 
Index Executive Output variable Regressors [beta0 beta1 beta2] R^2 
S5
RE
IT
S 
 
CEO 
Volatility SG   OG [0.5017 -0.2062 0.0118] 0.0515 
Value at Risk SG   OG [-0.0798 0.0317 -0.0034] 0.0413 
CFO 
Volatility SG   OG [0.4711 -0.1619 0.0567] 0.0277 
Value at Risk SG   OG [-0.0723 0.0183 -0.0113] 0.0144 
CEO & CFO 
Volatility SG   OG [0.4863 -0.1813 0.0008] 0.0316 
Value at Risk SG   OG [-0.0763 0.0261 -0.0045] 0.0235 
CEO + CFO 
Volatility SG   OG [0.5018 -0.2215 0.0367] 0.0516 
Value at Risk SG   OG [-0.0785 0.0322 -0.0097] 0.0393 
Table 4 Multilinear regression results for S5REITS - Risk = β0+ β1×(SG Prop) +β2×(OG Prop) 
Regression results in tables above indicate no significant relation between compensation and risk. 
Coefficients of determinations are low (at most 0.05) and lines are almost flat.  
 
 
 
 
  
The graph below shoes the correlation between value at risk and components of ELC, It’s obvious that there’s no observable 
pattern between S5REITS firms ELC and value at risk. 
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Figure 3 S5REITS firms CEO VaR & ELC correlation 
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 Just like CEO compensation, no pattern can be observed between CFO ELC components and the firm’s value at risk 
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Count 
Ticker  CEO 
SG  
CEO 
OG  
CEO  
ELC  
  CFO  
SG  
CFO 
OG  
CFO  
ELC  
         
1 HCN 0.662341 0 0.662341  0.533896 0 0.533896 
2 HST 0.660252 0.05055 0.710801  0.6582 0.04911 0.70731 
3 PSA 0.109413 0.134937 0.24435  0.278631 0.192969 0.4716 
4 VNO 0.481069 0.401225 0.882295  0.346631 0.268532 0.615162 
5 WY 0.439669 0.058491 0.49816  0.283417 0.041406 0.324823 
6 HCP 0.645311 0.217653 0.862964  0.432196 0.1318 0.563996 
7 PCL 0.421857 0.193767 0.615624  0.364373 0.151358 0.515731 
8 KIM 0.23402 0.334997 0.569017  0.161482 0.29601 0.457492 
9 GGP 0.412929 0.256887 0.669816  0.389121 0.393048 0.782169 
10 EQR 0.350048 0.388558 0.738606  0.194088 0.35152 0.545608 
11 SPG 0.500252 0.05957 0.559821  0.50409 0.04707 0.55116 
12 MAC 0.48283 0.01963 0.50246  0.428375 0.029079 0.457454 
13 AVB 0.491155 0.215517 0.706672  0.466899 0.191222 0.658121 
14 PLD 0.275235 0.143975 0.41921  0.372247 0.095462 0.467709 
15 ESS 0.205461 0.061556 0.267017  0.305734 0.040729 0.346463 
16 AIV 0.2426 0.576542 0.819141  0.489902 0.069107 0.559009 
17 BXP 0.553975 0.018347 0.572322  0.403433 0.009913 0.413346 
18 AMT 0.358234 0.431577 0.789811  0.318945 0.395875 0.714819 
19 VTR 0.551895 0.244001 0.795896  0.521872 0.224591 0.746463 
20 CCI 0.81269 0.043411 0.856101  0.775464 0.036535 0.811999 
         
Average ELC compensation values for each of the S5REITS firms (2006-2012) 
Equity based compensation comprise a high proportion of executive compensation in REIT 
industry. On average for CEOs in S5REITS firms, the percentage for stock grants, option grants and ELC 
grants are 44%, 20% and 63% of total compensation. For CFOs these values are 41%, 15% and 56%. 
These figures show that top REIT firms heavily rely on equity linked compensation for their executives.  
For 15 companies out of 20, the CEO compensation ratios are higher than those of CFOs. This 
contrasts Venema’s (2013) founding in US investment banks where CEOs are typically awarded a higher 
proportion of option grants while CFOs are awarded a higher proportion of stock awards. 
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5. Conclusion 
To summarize the result of this dissertation, based on the framework that I used, contrary to my 
expectation I didn’t observe any significant relation between firm risk and executive compensation in 
REITS. This supplements the result of Griffith, Najand, and Weeks (2011) who could not establish a link 
between risk and bonuses in REITS although they find a positive link between CEO salary and REITS risk. 
My result also contradicts Pennathur, Gilley, and Shelor (2005) who established a positive link between 
option awards and REITS return volatility. The different result in this paper could be due to the different 
period studied in this paper. When the number of the firms evaluated is narrowed down to 20 firms in 
S5REIT, the relation becomes less, although still, insignificant. This result is particularly interesting for 
option grants. As mentioned earlier, option grants are introduced to give managers incentive to take 
more risk. It could be that the effect is cancelled out by the amount of stock options offered to 
managers.  
In S5REITS, in 16 out of 20 listed firms, compared to CFOs, higher proportion of CEO’s 
compensation comes from equity linked compensation.  Same goes with ELC components, stock grants 
and option grants. This is different from other industries.  
Future Research 
Controlling for different contributors of ELC is one of the areas that can be addressed. The 
question would be, if compensation of executives are heavily weighted on the option grants, will ther 
still be no significant relation between ELC and option grants? Further research could also take into 
account other factors not included in this research. Differentiating between different segments of real 
estate industry and examining risk and ELC would be one possibility. Also, structure of the research 
could take into account other contributors of salary into account. Other factors that can affect the 
relation between ELC and risk behaviour of the firm include, firm size, CEO/CFO power (tenure, risk, 
interlock relationship and ownership), institutional ownership, firm performance, etc. 
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APPENDIX A : MATLAB Codes: 
To calculate and write Volatility and Value at risk for each firm 
 
% script to call the function that fills up the WRDS companies’ volatility 
% and VaR99 
clc 
%clear all 
  
xlsFilename = 'S5REITFinal'; 
CEO_CFO = 'CEO_CFO'; 
CEOplusCFO = 'CEO+CFO'; 
CEO = 'CEO'; 
CFO = 'CFO'; 
  
VolVarWriter( xlsFilename, CEO_CFO); 
VolVarWriter( xlsFilename, CEOplusCFO); 
VolVarWriter( xlsFilename, CEO); 
VolVarWriter( xlsFilename, CFO); 
 
function  VolVarWriter( xlsFileName, sheet) 
  
  
% Reads the year and ticker from the spreadsheet obtained from WRDS 
% Calculates annual volatility and historical VaR99 
% inputs: 
%   inputRange : Range of ticker and year in wrds spreadsheet 
%   volRange : the range that violatility values should be written to  
%   var99Range: the range that var99 values should be written to 
xlsAddress = 
strcat('C:\Users\hnaderik\Dropbox\REIT\Data\Final\',xlsFileName,'.xlsx'); 
[num] = xlsread(xlsAddress,sheet,'B:B'); 
lastRow = num2str(size(num,1)+1); 
inputRange = strcat('B2',':C',lastRow); 
  
[yrs,tckrs,raw]=xlsread(xlsAddress,sheet,inputRange); 
  
%ticker = unique(txt,'stable'); 
%yearS = unique(yr, 'stable'); 
  
stocks_Vol = NaN(size(raw,1),1); 
HistVaR99 = NaN(size(raw,1),1); 
  
for idx = 1 : size(raw,1) 
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    Beginning_Date = strcat('0101',num2str(raw{idx,1})); 
    End_Date = strcat('0101', num2str(raw{idx,1} + 1)); 
     
    stocks = 
hist_stock_data(Beginning_Date,End_Date,raw{idx,2},'frequency','d'); 
  
    if isempty(stocks) 
        stocks_Vol(idx)=NaN; 
    else 
        Prices=stocks.AdjClose; 
        Returns=Prices(1:end-1)./Prices(2:end)-1; 
        stocks_Vol(idx)=sqrt(260)*std(Returns); 
        HistVaR99(idx) = computeHistoricalVaR(Returns,.99,0); 
  
    end 
end 
  
[dummy,xlsHeader] = xlsread(xlsAddress,sheet,'A1:Z1'); 
VolColumnNo = find(strncmp('Annual Vol',xlsHeader,20)); 
if isempty(VolColumnNo) 
    error('volatility column not found, exiting...') 
else 
    volCol = char('A'+ (VolColumnNo - 1)); 
    volRange = strcat(volCol,'2:',volCol,lastRow); 
    var99Range = strcat(volCol+1,'2:',volCol+1,lastRow); 
  
    xlswrite(xlsAddress,stocks_Vol,sheet,volRange); 
    xlswrite(xlsAddress,HistVaR99,sheet,var99Range); 
end 
  
end 
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To model Volatility and Value at Risk and ELC components 
 
% script to call the function that fills up the WRDS companies volatility 
% and VaR99 
%clc 
%clear all 
  
xlsFilename1 = '4040Final'; 
xlsFilename2 = 'S5REITFinal'; 
  
DataSetName1 = 'SINDEX 4040_'; 
DataSetName2 = 'S5REIT_'; 
  
CEO_CFO = 'CEO_CFO'; 
CEOplusCFO = 'CEO+CFO'; 
CEO = 'CEO'; 
CFO = 'CFO'; 
  
% newModeling( xlsFilename1, CEOplusCFO,DataSetName1); 
% newModeling( xlsFilename1, CEO_CFO,DataSetName1); 
% newModeling( xlsFilename1, CEO,DataSetName1); 
% newModeling( xlsFilename1, CFO,DataSetName1); 
  
newModeling( xlsFilename2, CEOplusCFO,DataSetName2); 
newModeling( xlsFilename2, CEO_CFO,DataSetName2); 
newModeling( xlsFilename2, CEO,DataSetName2); 
newModeling( xlsFilename2, CFO,DataSetName2); 
 
function newModeling(xlsFileName, sheet, DataSetName) 
  
  
%xlsAddress = 
strcat('C:\Users\hnaderik\Dropbox\REIT\Data\Final\',xlsFileName,'.xlsx'); 
xlsAddress = 
strcat('C:\Users\HoNad\Dropbox\REIT\Data\Final\',xlsFileName,'.xlsx'); 
  
%find the input range in data sheet 
[dummy,xlsHeader] = xlsread(xlsAddress,sheet,'A1:Z1'); 
[num] = xlsread(xlsAddress,sheet,'B:B'); 
lastRow = num2str(size(num,1)+1); 
  
  
SGcolumnNo = find(strncmp('SG Prop',xlsHeader,20)); 
if isempty(SGcolumnNo) 
    error('SG Prop column not found, exiting...') 
else 
    SGcol = char('A'+ (SGcolumnNo - 1)); 
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    inputRange = 
xlsread(xlsAddress,sheet,strcat(SGcol,'2:',SGcol+4,lastRow)); 
     
    SGrange = inputRange(:,1); 
    OGrange = inputRange(:,2); 
    ELCrange = inputRange(:,3); 
    VOLrange = inputRange(:,4); 
    VARrange = inputRange(:,5); 
     
%     OGnotZero = find(OGrange~=0); 
%     OGrangeNonZero = OGrange(OGnotZero); 
%     VOLrangeNonZeroOG = VOLrange(OGnotZero); 
%     VARrangeNonZeroOG = VARrange(OGnotZero); 
     
end 
  
  
% Regress executive compensation proportion data on FirmVol  
  
SGstatsVOL=regstats(VOLrange,SGrange,'linear'); 
OGstatsVOL=regstats(VOLrange,OGrange,'linear'); 
ELCstatsVOL=regstats(VOLrange,ELCrange,'linear'); 
%OGnonZeroStatsVOL = 
regstats(OGrangeNonZero,VOLrangeNonZeroOG,'purequadratic'); 
  
% Regress executive compensation proportion data on FirmVar  
SGstatsVAR=regstats(VARrange,SGrange,'linear'); 
OGstatsVAR=regstats(VARrange,OGrange,'linear'); 
ELCstatsVAR=regstats(VARrange,ELCrange,'linear'); 
% OGnonZeroStatsVAR = 
regstats(OGrangeNonZero,VARrangeNonZeroOG,'purequadratic'); 
  
% DISPLAY fit 
% CEO & CFO sample Vol: 
rSquareSGvol = SGstatsVOL.rsquare; 
rSquareOGvol = OGstatsVOL.rsquare; 
rSquareELCvol = ELCstatsVOL.rsquare; 
%rSquareNonZeroOGvol = OGnonZeroStatsVOL.rsquare; 
  
% CEO & CFO sample VaR: 
rSquareSGvar = SGstatsVAR.rsquare; 
rSquareOGvar = OGstatsVAR.rsquare; 
rSquareELCvar = ELCstatsVAR.rsquare; 
% rSquareNonZeroOGvar = OGnonZeroStatsVAR.rsquare; 
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
% PLOTTING regressions: 
%VOL 
  
% Plot SG regression vs. Volatility 
set(figure,'name',strcat(DataSetName,' ', sheet),'numbertitle','off') 
subplot(3,2,1), scatter(SGrange,VOLrange);  
hold on; 
title(strcat(sheet,' Compensation vs. Firm Volatility')) 
  
h1 = lsline; 
set(h1,'color','r'); 
  
%legend(strcat('Best Fit, ',' R^2 = ',num2str(rSquareSGvol))) 
  
line1 = strcat('Best Fit, ',' R^2 = ',num2str(rSquareSGvol)); 
line2 = strcat('Y = ', num2str(SGstatsVOL.beta(2)) ,' * X + 
',num2str(SGstatsVOL.beta(1))); 
legend( sprintf( '%s\n%s', line1, line2 ) ) 
  
xlabel('Stock Grant Prop.') 
ylabel('Firm Volatility') 
grid on 
  
%  %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
% Plot OG regression vs. volatility 
subplot(3,2,3), scatter(OGrange,VOLrange); 
% title(strcat(sheet,' Sample: Option Grant Proportion vs. Firm Volatility')) 
h2 = lsline; 
set(h2,'color','r'); 
  
line1 = strcat('Best Fit, ',' R^2 = ',num2str(rSquareOGvol)); 
line2 = strcat('Y = ', num2str(OGstatsVOL.beta(2)) ,' * X + 
',num2str(OGstatsVOL.beta(1))); 
legend( sprintf( '%s\n%s', line1, line2 ) ) 
  
xlabel('Option Grant Prop.') 
ylabel('Firm Volatility') 
  
grid on 
  
% Plot ELC regression vs. volatility 
subplot(3,2,5), scatter(ELCrange,VOLrange); 
%title(strcat(sheet,'Sample: ELC Proportion vs. Firm Volatility')) 
h3 = lsline; 
set(h3,'color','r') 
line1 = strcat('Best Fit, ',' R^2 = ',num2str(rSquareELCvol)); 
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line2 = strcat('Y = ', num2str(ELCstatsVOL.beta(2)) ,' * X + 
',num2str(ELCstatsVOL.beta(1))); 
legend( sprintf( '%s\n%s', line1, line2 ) ) 
  
  
xlabel('ELC Prop.') 
ylabel('Firm Volatility') 
grid on 
  
% VaR 
% Plot SG regression vs. Value at Risk 
% set(figure,'name',strcat(DataSetName,' ', sheet),'numbertitle','off') 
  
subplot(3,2,2), scatter(SGrange,VARrange); 
title(strcat(sheet,' Compensation vs. Firm Value at Risk')) 
h4 = lsline; 
set(h4,'color','r') 
line1 = strcat('Best Fit, ',' R^2 = ',num2str(rSquareSGvar)); 
line2 = strcat('Y = ', num2str(SGstatsVAR.beta(2)) ,' * X + 
',num2str(SGstatsVAR.beta(1))); 
legend( sprintf( '%s\n%s', line1, line2 ), 'Location','SouthEast') 
  
%legend(strcat('Best Fit, ',' R^2 = 
',num2str(rSquareSGvar)),'Location','NorthWest') 
xlabel('Stock Grant Prop.') 
ylabel('Firm VaR') 
grid on 
  
% Plot  OG regression vs. Value at Risk 
subplot(3,2,4), scatter(OGrange,VARrange); 
%title(strcat(sheet,' Sample: Option Grant Proportion vs. Firm Value at 
Risk')) 
h5 = lsline; 
set(h5,'color','r') 
line1 = strcat('Best Fit, ',' R^2 = ',num2str(rSquareOGvar)); 
line2 = strcat('Y = ', num2str(OGstatsVAR.beta(2)) ,' * X + 
',num2str(OGstatsVAR.beta(1))); 
legend( sprintf( '%s\n%s', line1, line2 ), 'Location','SouthEast') 
  
% legend(strcat('Best Fit, ',' R^2 = 
',num2str(rSquareOGvar)),'Location','NorthWest') 
xlabel('Option Grant Prop.') 
ylabel('Firm VaR') 
grid on 
  
% Plot ELC regression vs. Value at Risk 
subplot(3,2,6), scatter(ELCrange,VARrange); 
h6 = lsline; 
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set(h6,'color','r') 
line1 = strcat('Best Fit, ',' R^2 = ',num2str(rSquareELCvar)); 
line2 = strcat('Y = ', num2str(ELCstatsVAR.beta(2)) ,' * X + 
',num2str(ELCstatsVAR.beta(1))); 
legend( sprintf( '%s\n%s', line1, line2 ), 'Location','SouthEast') 
  
%title(strcat(sheet,'Sample: ELC Proportion vs. Firm Value at Risk')) 
%legend(strcat('Best Fit, ',' R^2 = 
',num2str(rSquareELCvar)),'Location','NorthWest') 
xlabel('ELC Prop.') 
ylabel('Firm VaR') 
  
grid on 
 
end 
 
Multinear regressions 
function RiskvsELCmodeling(xlsFileName, sheet, DataSetName) 
  
  
%xlsAddress = 
strcat('C:\Users\hnaderik\Dropbox\REIT\Data\Final\',xlsFileName,'.xlsx'); 
xlsAddress = 
strcat('C:\Users\HoNad\Dropbox\REIT\Data\Final\',xlsFileName,'.xlsx'); 
  
%find the input range in data sheet 
[dummy,xlsHeader] = xlsread(xlsAddress,sheet,'A1:Z1'); 
[num] = xlsread(xlsAddress,sheet,'B:B'); 
lastRow = num2str(size(num,1)+1); 
  
  
SGcolumnNo = find(strncmp('SG Prop',xlsHeader,20)); 
if isempty(SGcolumnNo) 
    error('SG Prop column not found, exiting...') 
else 
    SGcol = char('A'+ (SGcolumnNo - 1)); 
     
    inputRange = 
xlsread(xlsAddress,sheet,strcat(SGcol,'2:',SGcol+4,lastRow)); 
     
    SGrange = inputRange(:,1); 
    OGrange = inputRange(:,2); 
    ELCrange = inputRange(:,3); 
    VOLrange = inputRange(:,4); 
    VARrange = inputRange(:,5); 
    Xrange = [SGrange OGrange]; 
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end 
  
  
 
ELCstatsVOL=regstats(VOLrange,Xrange,'linear'); 
 
DataSetName 
sheet 
'VOL' 
ELCstatsVOL.beta 
ELCstatsVOL.rsquare 
  
% Regress executive compensation proportion data on FirmVar  
ELCstatsVAR=regstats(VARrange,Xrange,'linear'); 
 
DataSetName 
sheet 
'VaR' 
ELCstatsVAR.beta 
ELCstatsVAR.rsquare 
  
end 
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APPENDIX B:  ELC vs. RISK plots and regression results SPINDEX 4040 : CEO+CFO ELC vs. Volatility and Value at Risk 
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S5REITS : CEO+CFO ELC vs. Volatility and Value at Risk 
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SPINDEX 4040 : CEO ELC vs. Volatility and Value at Risk 
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SPINDEX 4040 : CFO ELC vs. Volatility and Value at Risk 
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S5REITS: CEO  vs. Volatility and Value at Risk 
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S5RITS: CFO ELC VS. Volatility and Value at Risk 
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